Table of contents (for this page):
If you could use some help with BGP, have a look at my business web site: inet6consult.com.
BGP routing coursesThere are currently no training courses planned.
Interdomain Routing & IPv6 News
I love podcasts. So I'm every happy to be interviewed about BGP on Software Engineering Radio:
Iljitsch van Beijnum, author of the book BGP: Building Reliable Networks with the Border Gateway Protocol https://www.oreilly.com/pub/au/970 discusses internet routing and BGP – the border gateway protocol used by ISPs to update routing information. Host Robert Blumen spoke with Iljitsch about the topology of the internet, autonomous systems (AS), regulatory bodies that coordinate the AS space, IP addresses, the assignment of IPs to ASs; tier-one ISPs, carriers, and home/business ISPs; Internet routing; the path of a packet; routing tables, what they contain, and how they are constructed; routing algorithms; BGP and its role in updating routers with the knowledge of routes held by other routers; and BGP messages. Drill down into the update message. How updates progress from BGP into routing algorithms and then routing tables. What can go wrong. Attacks on BGP.
Someone pointed out that the BGP expert test I've had on BGPExpert.com for a very long time didn't work anymore. I fixed that, and also changed a few questions. So I think I can now call it the BGP expert test v2.0.
Check it out and tell me your score!
In a recent blog post The Effectiveness of AS Path Prepending (1) Russ White asks:
Just about everyone prepends AS’ to shift inbound traffic from one provider to another—but does this really work?
(AS path prepending means making the network path as BGP sees it longer to make a path less attractive so traffic will flow over another, shorter path.)
That's an interesting question, as I've been telling people for a long time that it often works too well. A single prepend can flip more than half your traffic from one link to another. In part because of that, Rolf Winter and I worked on a new Origin Preference Attribute that would provide a finer-grained tool for BGP traffic engineering. (Slides, old Internet-Draft, SAC'12 publication.)
But the answer that Russ cites from research into AS path prepending makes sense:
We observe that the effectiveness of prepending can strongly depend on the location (for around 20% of cases, ASPP has moved no targets, while for another 20% , it moved almost all targets).
The the fact that different networks get such different results when performing AS path prepending can be explained by looking at the type of network and the type of connectivity they have. Suppose a small network X has connections to big ISPs A and B. A and B have direct peering relations with most of the other large ISPs. So to the rest of the world, the two paths to X are the same length:
A X = 2 hops
When X now prepends towards A, it's A X X = 3 hops vs B X = 2 hops so most traffic will now flow through the B X path. Prepending was extremely effective.
But what if instead of X doing prepending, A prepends. Now for traffic to X, it's still:
A A X = 3 hops
But other networks that directly connect to A and have traffic for A itself, it doesn't matter if they see A = 1 hop or A A = 2 hops: the traffic needs to go to A, so the path length isn't considered. Even when network C is a customer of B and C sees a direct path and a path over B:
A A A = 3 hops
C will use the direct path, even though it's longer, because the rule is: paths to customers are prioritized over paths to peers and paths to peers over paths to transit providers.
So: will AS path prepending be effective? As with most things in life, it depends.
Ben Cox (Benjojo) has an interesting post about stuck BGP routes and a flaw in many BGP implementations where they hang when their neighbor stops accepting data over TCP: Hunting down the stuck BGP routes
A stuck BGP route means that a prefix was advertised at some point, and then it's withdrawn but the withdrawal somehow gets lost somewhere, so part of the internet still sees the withdrawn route.
There doesn't seem to be an obvious way to get these prefixes unstuck, although I would try advertising them again and withdrawing them again. The AS in the middle where the prefixes are stuck should probably clear (reset) BGP sessions until the problem is fixed, although I would be tempted to just reboot the whole router just to be safe.
The hanging issue happens when a router gets behind on processing incoming BGP updates. At some point its TCP receive buffer fills up, so it sets its TCP window size to 0. Then the buffer on the sending BGP neighbor starts to fill up with updates and keepalives. When that buffer is full, the sending BGP process can't write data to the TCP socket anymore... and bad things start to happen.
Ben feels that the BGP spec needs to be updated to address this issue. However, this is not a matter of interoperation that needs to be standardized, but simply an implementation issue that each vendor can fix on their own, in my opinion.
My Books: "BGP" and "Running IPv6"On this page you can find more information about my book "BGP". Or you can jump immediately to chapter 6, "Traffic Engineering", (approx. 150kB) that O'Reilly has put online as a sample chapter. Information about the Japanese translation can be found here.
More information about my second book, "Running IPv6", is available here.
BGP SecurityBGP has some security holes. This sounds very bad, and of course it isn't good, but don't be overly alarmed. There are basically two problems: sessions can be hijacked, and it is possible to inject incorrect information into the BGP tables for someone who can either hijack a session or someone who has a legitimate BGP session.
Session hijacking is hard to do for someone who can't see the TCP sequence number for the TCP session the BGP protocol runs over, and if there are good anti-spoofing filters it is even impossible. And of course using the TCP MD5 password option (RFC 2385) makes all of this nearly impossible even for someone who can sniff the BGP traffic.
Nearly all ISPs filter BGP information from customers, so in most cases it isn't possible to successfully inject false information. However, filtering on peering sessions between ISPs isn't as widespread, although some networks do this. A rogue ISP could do some real damage here.
There are now two efforts underway to better secure BGP:
The IETF RPSEC (routing protocol security) working group is active in this area.
What is BGPexpert.com?BGPexpert.com is a website dedicated to Internet routing issues. What we want is for packets to find their way from one end of the globe to another, and make the jobs of the people that make this happen a little easier.
Ok, but what is BGP?Have a look at the "what is BGP" page. There is also a list of BGP and interdomain routing terms on this page.
BGP and MultihomingIf you are not an ISP, your main reason to be interested in BGP will probably be to multihome. By connecting to two or more ISPs at the same time, you are "multihomed" and you no longer have to depend on a single ISP for your network connectivity.
This sounds simple enough, but as always, there is a catch. For regular customers, it's the Internet Service Provider who makes sure the rest of the Internet knows where packets have to be sent to reach their customer. If you are multihomed, you can't let your ISP do this, because then you would have to depend on a single ISP again. This is where the BGP protocol comes in: this is the protocol used to carry this information from ISP to ISP. By announcing reachability information for your network to two ISPs, you can make sure everybody still knows how to reach you if one of those ISPs has an outage.
For those of you interested in multihoming in IPv6 (which is pretty much impossible at the moment), have a look at the "IPv6 multihoming solutions" page.
Are you a BGP expert? Take the test to find out!
These questions are somewhat Cisco-centric. We now also have another set of questions and answers for self-study purposes.
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